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In a research project conducted 
while visiting the DG-ECFIN in 
June 2010, we provided a detailed 
empirical investigation of the 
EMU sovereign-debt crisis up to 
February 2010.  We addressed ﬁ ve 
distinct questions. First, what are 
the driving forces of EMU spreads 
before and during the global 
ﬁ nancial crisis? 
Second, why did the Greek spread 
escalate so dramatically since 
November 2009? Third, why has the 
Greek spread been so much higher 
compared to other periphery EMU 
countries?  Fourth, has the Greek 
crisis caused contagion to other 
EMU countries? Finally, what is 
the role of speculation in the Credit 
Default Swaps (CDS) market? 
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Using monthly data covering the period 
January 1999 – February 2010 and 
a range of estimation techniques we 
reached the following ﬁ ndings:  
First, prior to the global credit crunch 
(January 1999 – July 2007) markets 
priced neither macro-fundamentals nor 
international risk. Markets, however, 
have changed drastically their pricing 
behaviour since August 2007. During the 
crisis period, markets have been pricing 
both the international risk factor and 
macro-fundamentals on a country-by-
country basis. 
Second, the Greek debt crisis is due to 
a background of deteriorating macro-
fundamentals over 1999-2009 and a 
double shift in private expectations. 
Starting from November 2009, Greece 
was transferred from a regime of 
fully-credible commitment to EMU 
participation under the perception of fully 
guaranteed (by other EMU countries) 
ﬁ scal liabilities, to a regime of non-fully 
credible EMU commitment without 
ﬁ scal guarantees. This regime-shift not 
only explains the sudden escalation of 
the Greek debt crisis in November 2009 
but also the difference in spread values 
between Greece and other periphery 
EMU countries. In short, Greece’s 
problems are as much about trust as they 
are about economics. 
Third, the majority of EMU countries 
have experienced contagion from Greece, 
most prominently Portugal, Ireland and 
Spain: The Greek problem has become an 
EMU-wide problem. 
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Our ﬁ ndings have policy implications 
both at the national as well as the union 
level. 
First, for the spreads of EMU-
periphery countries to decline a marked 
improvement in ﬁ scal position and 
external competitiveness is necessary. 
Second, periphery EMU countries must 
pursue a reversal of private expectations 
to a more favourable status. This can 
only be achieved through a credible 
strategy of structural reforms, backed by 
evidence of determined implementation. 
Without such evidence markets will 
continue to doubt the sustainability 
of these countries’ participation in the 
EMU, and the risk that these expectations 
will become self-fulﬁ lling will remain. 
At the union level, the crisis has 
highlighted the necessity of institutional 
reforms in two directions. 
First, to prevent future crises the EMU 
must develop effective mechanisms 
of ﬁ scal supervision and policy co-
ordination. 
Second, if a crisis does occur, it is 
important to prevent its escalation in 
the affected country and its contagion 
to others. This can be achieved through 
the creation of a permanent EMU-run 
mechanism of emergency ﬁ nancing. 
For such a mechanism to be successful 
in stabilising expectations, its rules and 
terms must be transparent and known 
ex-ante. At the same time, the terms 
of emergency ﬁ nance must be such as 
to eliminate the risk of moral hazard 
discouraging ﬁ scal discipline and 
reforms. Identifying rules achieving 
both objectives simultaneously is a 
challenging task calling for signiﬁ cant 
attention from academics and policy-
makers alike. 
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Finally, we do not ﬁ nd evidence in favour 
of the hypothesis that speculation in CDS 
markets is a major force driving the euro 
debt crisis. This does not imply that CDS 
speculation is not taking place or it does 
not drive EMU spreads at higher data 
frequencies. But it does imply that in the 
longer-term perspective captured by our 
monthly data frequency, EMU spreads 
are mainly driven by accumulated intra-
EMU macroeconomic imbalances and 
international risk conditions. 
What are the 
driving forces 
of EMU spreads 
before and 
during the 
global ﬁ nancial 
crisis?
